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Investment Strategy in an Inflationary Environment
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the issue of how an investor concerned about the
real rate of return on his investment portfolio should allocate his funds
among four major asset classes: stocks, bonds, bills and commodity futures
contracts. It employs the Markowitz mean—variance framework to derive
estimates of the pre—tax, real risk—return tradeoff curve currently facing
an investor in the U.S. capital markets.
Some of the major findings are: 1) Bills are the cornerstone of any
low—risk investment strategy. The minimum—risk portfolio has a mean real
rate of return of zero and a standard deviation of about 1%. The slope of
the tradeoff curve is initially 1, but it declines rapidly as one progresses
up the curve to higher mean rates of return. 2) Stocks offer the highest
mean and are also riskiest. 3) Bonds play a prominent part in portfolios
which lie in the midsection of the tradeoff curve, although not much would
be lost if these instruments were eliminated. 4) Commodity futures contracts
are the only asset whose returns are positively correlated with inflation.
By adding them to the portfolios of stocks, bonds and bills, it is possible
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The basic premise of this paper is that ultimately what is ofconcern
to an investor, whether a household or an institutional investor such as a life
insurance company or a pension fund, is the real value of its investments in
terms of purchasing power over consumer goods and services. The issue to be
addressed is what investment strategies make sense in an economic environment in
which a major factor (although certainly not the only one) to be considered
is substantial uncertainty about the future level of the prices of those goods
and services. By investment strater I mean decisions about how to allocate
investible funds among four major asset classes: common stocks and other equity
investments, long—term fixed—interest debt instruments, short—term or variable—
rate debt instruments, and other "inflation—hedging" assets such as commodity
futures contracts or commodity—linked bonds.
The paper is organized as follows. I will first discuss why it is real or
inflation—adjusted rates of return and their uncertainty which ought to be the
main concern of investors. I will then present an analytical framework for for-
mulating investment strategy, examine the historical record of real rates of
return on the four asset categories, and derive estimates of alternative risk—
return tradeoff curves. Finally, I will discuss the implications of my findings
for individual and institutional asset allocation policies.—2—
I.Thy It Is Real Investment Returns and Their Uncertainty That tter.
Withrespect to the individual investor, i.e. the household, there can
be little doubt that the dollar value of its investment portfolio is not what
counts, 'out rather its real value in terms of purchasing power. It follows,
therefore, that households will be concerned about the real or inflation—
adjusted rate of return rather than the nominal rate of return on their
investments. If the future rate of inflation were known with certainty, it
would make no difference whether households were making their portfolio deci-
sions on the basis of real or nominal rates of return. The expected real rate
on any particular asset would just be the nominal rate less the known inflation
rate, and its real risk would be the same as its noiainal risk. But in an
environment of uncertainty about future inflation there can be a great dif-
ference between the real and nominal risk associated with an asset. The most
extreme example is the case of conventional bonds and mortgages which offer a
guaranteed nominal return to an investor, but a highly uncertain real one. As
inflation becomes more uncertain, these instruments become riskier and less
attractive to households.
But what about institutional investors, should they be concerned with real
or nominal rates of return? Institutional investors are financial inter-
mediaries between the nonfinancial business sector and the household sector of
the economy. Their ultimate survival and success depend on providing households
with the kinds of financial assets that households want to hold. In our infla—
tionary environment contractual savings plans such as ordinary life insurance
policies, which offer guaranteed nominal cash flows, and money—fixed annuities
have become unattractive.In order to maintain their viability, life insurance
companies must respond byofferingnew products and adjusting their investment—3—
policies accordingly. In a previous paper I have discussedthe feasibility of
indexed annuities as a po ile innovation forproviding stable real retirement
income in a inflationary environment, andmany other suggestions along these
lines are bound to be forthcoming in the future.1The central concern of
investment policy in this new environment llsurely be real rates of return
and their uncertainty.
at about pension plans and pension funds?Wny shod they care about
real rates of return? Under many corporatedc±ined—henefjt pension plans, the
staing level of the retirement benefit promdsed to the workeris based on an
average of the worker's wage in the last several years prior to retirement.If, as
in the past, wages increase in tandem withconsuner prices, then such a plants
liabilities are in effect indexed during thephase of benefit accrual.
Furthermore, it is likely that the future evolution ofpension plans is going to
be in the direction of at least paial indexationof benefits in the post—
retirement phase too. Thus, at least thesepension funds have to plan their
investment strategy with a focus on real rates ofreturn too.
II. The Theory of Portfolio Selection.
The analytical framework which underlies the investmentstrategies I will
present in this paper is known as mean—variance analysis, and itgoes back
almost thirty years to the pioneering workby Harry Markowitz.2 The basic pre—
mise underlying this approach is that the investoris risk—averse, that is to
say, given a choice between two investments offering the samemean (or average)
rate of return the investor would always choose theone that has less risk.
Risk in the context of this analysis is identified withthe unpredictability or
uncertainty of achieving one's expected rate of return and is measuredby its
variance or standard deviation._'4 -
Theinvestor's decision process is divided into two stages.In the first
stage he computes what his risk—return opportunities are, and in the second he
chooses the risk—return combination which suits him 'best.In stage one, the
investor starts by finding the minimum—risk strategy, determining the nean rate
of return associated with it, and then proceeding to derive other portfolios
which offer higher and higher means with the least possible risk. The result of
this part of the process is a tradeoff curve showing the terms—of—trade 'between
risk and expected return.3
The inputs needed to generate the tradeoff curve are the means and standard
deviations of the real rates of return on the individual assets and the correla-
tions among them. In the following section we examine what these parameters
have 'been over the past 27 years and discuss our assumptions about their current
values.
III. Inflation and Asset Returns: The Historical Record.
Table 1 contains the historical record of real pre—tax rates of return on
each of four categories of assets for the period 1953 through 1979. The measure of
the price level that was used in adjusting these rates of return was the
Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator published by the U.S. Department of
Cormuerce. This measure was chosen rather than the Department of Labor's
Consumer Price Index 'because serious doubts about the adequacy of the CPI as a
measure of true inflation have been raised in the past seven or eight years.
The main objection to the CPI is that it gives too such weight to new mortgage
rates in the computation of shelter costs. The last two columns in Thble 1 pre-
sent the rate of inflation as measured first by the Consumer Price Index, then—5—
asmeasured by the Personal ConsumptionExpenditures Deflator.There are serious
d:fferences between the two Eres, esrecally in l91 and l99; but as the
correlation coefficient of .9T reported at the bottom of Table 1 indicates,
they are highly positively correlated.
The first column in Table 1 is the real rate of return on a policy of
"rolling over" thirty day easury bills, and is representative of the rate of
return on money—market instruments. This is by far the least volatile series,
with a standarddeviation of only l.li%. This is because over this period,
short—terminterest rates have tended to follow rather closely movements in the
rate of inflation.
Of course, this is not a coincidence. Allirket—determinedinterest rates
contain an "inflation premium," which reflects expectations about the declining
purchasing power of the money borrowed over the life of the loan. As the rate
of inflation has increased in recent years, so too has the inflation premium
built into interest rates. While long—term as well as short—term interest rates
contain such a premium, conventional long—term bonds lock the investor into the
current interest rate for the life of the bond. If long—term interest rates on
new bonds subsequently rise as a result of unexpected inflation, the funds
already locked in can be released only by selling the bonds on the secondary
market at a price well below theirface value. But ifan investor buys only
short—term bonds with an average maturity of about 30 days, then the interest
rate he earns will lag behind changes in the inflation rate by at most one
month.
The problem with money—market instruments, however, is their low rate of
return. Over the last 2?years,the average pre—tax, inflation—adjusted rate of—6—
TABLE 1
Annual HealFates of Beturn: 1953—1919
(percent per year)
Pate of Inflation
(i) (2) (3) c)4) () (6)
Year Bills Bonds Stocks CornrnodiyFutures CPI POE Deflator
1953 0.143 2.22 -2.314 -3.146 0.62 1.38
19514 0.1414 6.)4 51.98 13.214 —0.50 0.142
1955 0.35 —2.149 29.97 —7.63 0.37 1.22
1956 —0.96 —8.4 3.01 12.38 2.86 3.145
1951 0.10 14.28 —13.141 —5.04 3.02 3,014
1958 0.37 —1.19 141.70 —3.47 1.76 1.17
1959 0.86 —14.214 9.68 —2.814 1.50 2.07
1960 1.20 12.16 0.96 —3.93 1.48 1.69
1961 0.90 —0.25 25.36 0.02 0.67 1.22
1962 1.02 5.11 —10.25 —2.140 1.22 1.69
1963 1.57 —0.32 20.95 16.32 1.65 1.53
196)4 2.27 2.24 15.05 4.54 1.19 1.214
1965 1.33 —1.81 9.63 5.13 1.92 2.57
1966 2.09 1.00 —12.36 9.70 3.35 2.62
1967 0.53 —12.40 19.60 —0.06 3.014 3.66
1968 1.11 —)4.i4 6.74 —3.18 4.72 14.05
1969 1.414 —9.66 —12.92 12.19 6.11 5.07
1970 2.114 7.148 —0.28 —1.62 5.149 4.30
1971 0.3)4 8.83 9.87 —1.65 3.36 4.04
1972 o.i4 1.92 14.75 29.35 3.141 3.69
1973 —2.21 —9.57 —21.96 72.69 8.80 9.35
1974 —1.99 —5.30 —33.28 17.97 12.20 10.19
1975 0.21 3.42 29.95 —10.03 7.01 5.58
1976 —0.43 10.63 17.35 5.31 4.81 5.53
1977 —0.76 —6.22 —12.37 14.90 6.77 5.92
1978 —1.07 —6.62 —1.66 i8.6i 9.03 8.19
1979 0.08 —io.44 7.39 15.59 13.31 10.29
Mean 0.43-o.8 7.08 7.13 14.04 3.89
Standard
Deviation i.i4 6.86 19.46 16.26 3.56 2.85
Correlation Coeffecients:
Bonds Stocks Commodity Futures Inflation (POE)
Bills .357 .287 —.521 —.658




Note: Thereal returns were calculated according to the formula:
,1+nominalrate of return
Real rate of return =100x . —1
1+rateof inflation
using the PCE Deflator inflation rate. The rate of return on conmiodity
futures in column (4)was calculated differently, as explained in the text.
Sources: The data on 1 month bills, 20 years bonds, and stocks are from
Ibbotson and Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, Financial Analysts
Research Foundation, 1977, updated by the authors.
The Commodity futures series was derived from price data in the Wall Street
Journal using a method explained in the text.
Thedata on the CPI and the PCE deflator are from U.S. Deoartment of Labor and
the Department of Commerce, respectively.-1—
returnon money—market instruments has been barely half apercent per year.In
the most recent six—year period, that return hasactually been negative.
Perhapsthe most likely scenario for the future is thatinflation—adjusted
returns ll hover around zero, i.e.
,theinterest rate ll be about equal to
the rate of inflation.
Column2presentsthe real rate of return an investor wouldhaveearnedby
investingin U.S. Ieasury bonds withatwenty year nturity. The assumption
underlyingthis series is that the investor bought a twenty—year bondat the
beginning of each year and sold it at the end. His return thereforeincludes
both coupon interest and capital gains or losses. As therelatively low mean
and high standard deviation indicate, the pasttwenty—seven years was a bad
period for the investor in long—term bonds. Capital losses causedby unan-
ticipated increases in interest rates tended to more than cancel thecoupon
yield over this period.
It would probably be a mistake to assume that themean real rate of return
on long—term government bonds in the future is going to be the—.87% peryear
that it was over the 1953 to 1979 period. A more reasonableapproach to esti-
mating the ex ante mean real rate would be to take the yield tomaturity on
long—term government bonds and subtract an estimate of themean rate of infla-
tion expected to prevail over the next 20years. When we do this we find a mean
real rate of return on U.S. Preasury bonds of 2%per year.
Column3 inThble 1 presents the real rateof return onthe Standard and
PoorTsCompositeIndex of common stocks which is a value—weighted stockport—
folio of the five—hundred largest corporations in the UnitedStates. The return—8—
includes dividends and capital gains. The mean real rate over our sampleperiod was
1.08%per year, but we will use 10% per year as our estimate of the ex ante mean
in our computations of the tradeoff curve. There are two main reasons fordoing
so. The first is that several recent careful studies of the real rate of return
on unlevered corporate capital (i.e.,thereturn to debt and equity combined)
indicate it to be in therange of 6to 1% per year. Since the average
debt/equity ratio for the S & P 500 companies is about 1/3, and the after—tax
real interest rate on corporate borrowing is quite negative, a 10% mean real
rate of return on levered equity seems plausible.5 The second reason is
that 10% per year is the estimate of the mean real rate of return on the S & P
500 derived by Robert C. Merton in a recent National Bureau of Economic Research
study employing a new estimation technique, which incorporates more information
than just the simple average of past rates.6
Finally, let us focus ourattention on column )4in Thble 1 which presents
theannual rate of return one wouldhave earned on a well—diversified portfolio
ofcommodityfutures contractsover the 1953 to1919 period. The rate of return
ona futures contract reflects the proportional change in the futures price over
the holding period. The series was generated by assuming a "buy and hold" stra—
tegy whereby contracts were entered into at quarterly intervals, held for three
months, and then liquidated. The number of commodities increases from 13in
1953to22bythe end of the period. Table 2presentsthe listofcommodities
and the year in which each was added to the portfolio. The portfolio was
assumed to consist of equal dollar amounts invested in each commodity contract.
Therates of return for commodity futures listed in column )4 of Table 1
require an interpretation that is different from the real rates in columns 1—9—
TABLE2
List of Commodity Futures Contracts Included in the Portfolio
























through 3. When an investor takes a long position in a futures contract he does
not buy it in the sense that he would buy a stock or bond or the physical corn—
modity itself; rather, he agrees to purchase the commodity for a specified price
at a certain point in the future. Thecommoditiesexchange which acts as an
intermediary requires all parties to a futures contract to post bond called
'trnargin"toguaranteeperformance.1Investors are permitted to post reasury
bills, on which they continue to earn the interest, so the funds used as
margin are therefore not strictly speaking an investment in commodity futures.
The rates of return reported in column1should therefore be interpreted as the
addition to the total investment portfolio rate of return the investor would
have earned in each year had he taken a position in commodity futures with a
face value equal to his total investment in other assets.
In order for a buy—and—hold strategy in the futures market to be profitable
it is not enough for spot prices to be rising; they must rise by more than was
anticipated in the futures price at the time the contract was entered into. On
average one might expect the spot price forecasts implicit in futures prices to
be right, and therefore expect the mean rate of return on futures contracts to
be zero.8 But what is more important for our purposes, futures contracts will
yield a positive rate of return when there are unanticipated increases inspot
prices, and it is this feature which makes them valuable as an inflation hedge.
The critical parameters which determine how valuable commodity futures are
in this role, and which play a crucial role in determining the shape of the tra-
deoff curve, are the correlation coefficients presented at the bottom of Thble
1.Perhapsthe most significant thing to notice is that the real rates of
return on bills, bonds, and stocks are all negatively correlated with inflation
and all positively correlated with each other. But commodity futures are posi--11—
tively correlated with the rate of inflation and negatively correlated with the
real rates of return on the other major asset categories, and therefore can
serve to reduce the risk associated with any portfolio containing them.
The mean rate of return on our buy—and—hold strategy in coimnodity futures
during the 1953 to 1919 period was7.13%per year, a strikingly large
number, and one which maynotbe an accurate indicator for the future. In com-
puting the tradeoff curve we will assume a rran of zero, althoughwewill also
,-LII':' IIlI- -II.L .:I1 LIL_.I__S_ILL OL_ L±I_IL_IAL_L_ 0 S_I I..SI_OS LI_SAL_I. LS5 CA SI_I.0 ILL_I. V CL*_S_ I_IL.
Beforeproceeding to our presentation of the risk—return tradeoff curves in
the next section, let us summarize the assumptions that we are making about the
key parameters relating to the real rates of return on bills, bonds, stocks and
commodity futures and the interrelationships among them. With regard to the
means, we assume zero on bills, 2% on bonds, 10% on stocks, and zero on commodity
futures. With regard to the standard deviations and correlations we assume the
ones reported in Table 1.
IV.The Risk—Return Tradeoff.
Wewill begin our analysis of the risk—return tradeoff by looking at port-
folios consisting only of stocks and bills. The minimum—risk investment stra-
tegy is to investentirelyin bills, in which case one's mean real rate of
return wouldbezero and one's standard deviation i.i4%.Atthe other extreme
onecould invest everything in stocks, in which case the mean real rate of
returnon the portfolio would be 10% and the standard deviation 19.46%. Table 3
shows us the combinations ofmean andstandard deviation of real rate of return
an investor would achieve by going from one of these extremes to the other.9
Figure 1 graphs this tradeoff curve as curve 1.For mean valuesabove 1% per
year, curve 1isvery close to a straight line with a slope of .53,indicating-12—
TABLE3
Risk—Return Trade—Off Curve: Stocks and Bills
Standard Portfolio Proportions
Mean Deviation Slope Stocks Bills




2 1.21 .2 .8
.53




5 9.91 .5 .5
.52
6 11.81 .6 .1
.52
7 13.72 .7' .3
•52
8 15.63 .8 .2
.52
9 17.5)4 .9 .1
•52
10 19.1t6 1.0 0
Assumptions about real rates of return:
Bills Stocks
Mean 0% 10.0%



































































































































































































































anincrease of about 2 percentage points in standard deviation forevery 1 per—
centage point increase in mean.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the nleaning of a movementalong
the risk—return tradeoff curve, we have graphed in Figure 2 threeprobability
distributions, corresponding to the first three points on curve 1.They are
based on the assumption that the distribution of the real rate of returnon the
portfolios is normal, i.e. a "bell—shaped" curve. The first corresponds to the
portfolio consisting of bills only, which has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of 1.Th%; the second to the portfolio which has 90percent invested in
bills and 10 percent invested in stocks with a mean real rate of return of 1%
per year and a standard deviation of 2.%; and the third to a portfolio which
has eighty percent invested in bills, twenty percent in stocks witha mean of 2%
per year and a standard deviation of )4.2)4%.As the proportion of the portfolio
invested in stocks and therefore the mean goup, the bell—shaped curve shifts
the right and becomes more flat or stretched out, indicatinggreater upside
potential but also greater downside risk.
Now let us consider what the tradeoff curve would look like if the investor
wererestricted to combinations of bonds and stocks.This curve is tabulated in
Table)4andgraphed as curve 2 in Figure 1.Note that as we move up curve 24k4
froma bonds—only portfolio to one containing a little stock, the standard
deviation actually fallsabit before starting to grow. The minimum—risk stock—
bond portfolio contains 6.)4%stocksand 93.6%bondsand has a mean and standard
deviation of 2.51% per year and 6.61%,respectively.J-0This implies that no
risk—averse investor wnuld ever rationally choose to hold a bonds—only
portfolio, since by substituting a small amountofstock for some of the bonds,




























































































































































































































































































































Risk—ReturnTrade—Off Curve: Stocks and Bonds
Standard Portfolio Proportions
Mean Deviation Slope Stocks Bonds
2% 6.86% o 1.0
—5.88
3 6.85 .125 .815
1.145
14 v.66 .25 .15
.11
5 9.01 .315 .625
.149
6 10.85 .5 .5
.50
1 12.85 .625 .315
.14
8 114.98 .75 .25
.145
9 11.19 .875 .125
.1414
10 19.146 1.0 0






Note: The minimum—risk portfolio consists of 6.14% stocks and 93.6%
bonds and has a mean and standard deviation of 2.51% and 6.614%,
respectively.—17—
Asa comparison of curves 1 and 2 makesclear,at mean real rates ofreturn
greater then 3.5% the stock—bond portfolios have less risk for any mean than do
the corresponding stock—bill portfolios. On the other hand, for mean values
below 3.5%, stock—bill portfolios have less risk for any mean than do the
corresponding stock—bond portfolios. Perhaps more important, however, is the
fact that very low risk strategies are unattainable using only stocks and bonds.
The mnimurn—risk stock—bond portfolio still hasastandard deviation of 6.6)4%,
whichis quite high compared to the lower risk levels attainable with bills.
Now let us consider portfolios containing all three assets: stocks, bonds
andbills. The process of computing the tradeoff curve in this case is more
complicated than before, because for each value of mean real rate of return one
must use an optimization procedure to find that portfolio which has the lowest
standard deviation.—' The resulting tradeoff curve and portfolio proportions are
presented in Table 5 and Figure 3 which allows us to compare the risk—return tradeoff
curve derived using all three assets to the two previously derived curves from
Figure 1.
The main improvement comes at the low risk, low return end of the curve. The
minimur—risk strategy is still to invest in bills only, but as we move up the curve
we replace bills with increasing amounts of both bonds and stocks. This continues up
to a mean of 5% per year. At higher means bills disappear from the portfolio and the
proportion of bonds declines; curve 3 just becomes identical to curve 2.One point
of special interest on curve 3,whichis not tabulated in Table5,is the point
having the same mean as the minimum—risk stock—bond portfolio on curve 2, i.e. 2.5%
per year.It consists of a portfolio with53%bills,28% bonds and 19% stocks and
has a standard deviation of )4.8%,asopposed to the 6.6)4%standarddeviation of the
minimum—risk stock—bond portfolio. Thus by adding bills to the minimum—risk
stock—bond portfolio one can achieve a substantial reduction in risk with no
loss in expected return.—18—
TABLE 5
Risk—Return Trade—Off Curve: Stocks, Bills and Bonds
Standard Portfolio Proportions
Mean Deviation Stocks Bonds Bills
0% i.i14% 0 0 1.00
.814
1 2.33 .08 .10 .82
.62
2 3.914 .15 .22 .63
.59
3 5.63 .23 .33
.58
14 1.314 .31 .145 .214
.58
5 9.06 .39 .56 .05
.56
6 10.85 .50 .50 0
.50
1 12.85 .63 .31 0
.147
8 114.98 .15 .25 0
.145
9 17.19 .88 .12 0
.1414
10 19.146 1.00 0 0
Assumptions about real rates of return:
Bills Bonds Stocks
Mean 0% 2% 10%































































































































































































































































Nowweare ready to introduce coimnodity futures contracts intoour
portfolio. It is important to remember that whenwe take a position in com-
modity futures we are not actually usingup any of our funds; our funds are
invested in stocks, bonds and bills. Weare simply taking a position which has
aface value equal to some specifiedproportion of the total amount invested in
these other assets. The only restrictionon our portfolio imposed by the
futurescontracts is that we must have an amount invested in billsequal to at
least 10 percent of the position incommodity futures, to serve as margin.
The results with commodity futures includedare presented in Table 6and
Figure .Notethat the minimu—risk strategy is still to invest 100percent of
ourfunds in bills, but it isnow optimal to hedge thatinvestmentwith a small
positionin our well—diversified commodity futuresportfolio by taking a long
position with a face value equal topercent of the investment in bills. Under
our assumption that the mean rate of returnon commodity futures is zero, the
mean real rate of return on our portfolio will remainunaffected, but there will
be a reduction in standard deviation.
Comparingcurves 3andin Figure ,wesee that for any mean real rate of
return, introducing the right amount of commodity futurescontracts into our
portfolio enables us to reduce our standard deviationby a significant amount.
Thereduction in standard deviation increasessteadily the higher the mean value
and is at its greatest value at anan of 9% per year. Introducing commodity
futures shifts the tradeoff curve to the leftby .17% at the minimum—risk end of
thecurve and by .93%atthe other end.
Looking at the last four columns in Table 6andcomparing them withthe
lastthree columns of Table 5wesee that the addition of commodity futures—21—
TkBLE6
Risk—ReturnTrade—Off: Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Commodity Futures
Standard Portfolio Proportions:
Mean Deviation Slope StocksBonds Bills Commodity Futures
0% 0.91% 0 0 1.00 .O1
1.01
1 1.96 .08 .12 .80 .08
•67
2 3.L)4 .15 .2L .61 .12
.65 - '.jy .C . .41. .10
.63
.30 .49 .21 .20
.63
5 8.16 .38 .59 .03
.56
6 9.93 .51 .16 .03 .27'
.50
7 11.93 .63 .3 .03 .29
.t7
8 l4.06 .6 .21 .03 .32
•)45
9 16.26 .88 .08 .O1 •314
.33
10 19.1t6 1.oo 0 0 0
Assumptions alout real rates of return:
BillsBonds StocksCommodity Futures
Mean 0% 2.0%10.0% 0%
Standard














































































































































































































contractsdoes not changetheportfolio proportions of stocks, bonds and bills
by much. The major effect is that bills do not disappear entirely from the
portfolio when we move to high mean real rates of return because there is a need
forbills to serve as margin on the commodity futures contracts. Wealsosee
that as we move to higher mean real rates of return and the investment in stocks
goes up, there is a steady increase in the size of the relative position in corn—
rnodityfutures, although it never exceeds 3)4 percentof the total value of the
investmentportfolio.
What is the effect on the tradeoff curve of assuming a positivemean rate
of return on commodity futures? Table 7 and Figure 5presentthe results of -7
assuminga 2% per year mean rate. Perhaps the best way to describe the effect
is as an upward shift of the entire curve. Atany level of risk it becomes
possible to achieve a higher mean real rate of return, with the gainbeing
larger the higher the level of risk. Even the minimum—risk portfolionow has a
positive mean rate of return. It now becomes possible to attaina 10% mean real
rate of return with a standard deviation of only 16.39% instead of19.)46%, by
holding a portfolio consisting of 86% stocks, 8% bonds, 6% bills anda position
in commodity futures equal to 59%ofthe portfolio's value.
It should be stressed once again before ending thispart of the paper that
therole of commodity futures stems from the fact that it isthe only asset
whosereturns are positively correlated with inflation. The reason thepropor-
tion of commodity futures in the portfolio rises in Table 6asthe investment in
stocks goes up is thatthereal return on stocks is negatively correlated with
inflation.I have performed the experiment of deriving the tradeoffcurve under
the assumption that the real return on stocks is uncorrelatedwith inflation,TABLE I
Effectof Increased Mean Rate of Return on Commodity Futures to 2% Per Year
—PortfolioProportions
MeanStandard Deviation StocksPondsBillsCommodity Futures
0.1% .97% 0 0 1.00 .014
1.0 1.714 .06 .10 .814 .09
2 3.06 .13 .21 .66 .114
3 14.146 .19 .33 .148 .20
14 5.89 .26 .1414 .30 .25
5 1.32 .33 .55 .12 .31
6 8.81 .14i .55 .014 .36
7 10.53 .53 .143 .014 .141
8 12.140 .614 .31 .05 .147
9 114.37 .75 .19 .06 .53











































































































































































































































































































































































































































and the result is that there would be virtually no role for commodity futures
contracts in that case.It is their value as a hedge against inflation, to off-
set the inflation risk associated with the investment in stocks, that accounts
for commodity futures' significant role.
V. Implications of Findings for Asset Allocation.
The first implication of our findings is that bills are the cornerstone of
any lowrisk investment strater. Here itis important to keep in mind that
billsforus are a proxy for all money market instruments and floating—rate
debt. ir results indicate that in order to achieve a low degree of risk, by
which we mean a standard deviation below ).%,atleast half of the portfolio
would have to be invested in these securities. Of course, along with the low
risk comes a low return.
Whomightbe interested in a low—risk strate,r, despite its low return?
The prime candidates are probably retired people with a small—to—moderate accu-
mulation of assets and a low tolerance for risk. In Great Britain the
government has for years been selling bonds bearing a zero real interest rate on
a voluntary and restricted basis to citizens aged 65andover.These bonds have
proven to be a very popularinvestment.
Our findingscarry twoimportant messages to institutional investors such
as life insurance companies. The first is that households can currently provide
themselveswith a fairly safepre—taxreal rate of return of about zero by
investingin money—market funds. Therefore any new kind of contractual savings
plan would have to offer a similar rate. The secondisthat if theinsurance
industry wanted to offer savings plans and/or annuities with fullorpartial
indexation they could hedge almost all of the investment risk byinvestingpri——27—
rriarilyin corey market instruments. In fact, if they wanted to avoid the
investment risk altogether, they could offer them as variable annuities.
What can we say about the role of bonds and other long—term fixed interest
securities? The first point suggested by our findings is that one can get along
without bonds with very little loss of portfolio efficiency; the improvement in
the risk—return tradeoff that one gets from adding bonds to stocks and bills is
relatively minor. Some institutional portfolio managers might say that the risk
associated with long—term bonds is exaggerated n xrr findings because I have
included in rqy measure of annual returns unrealized capital gains and losses.
Most insurance companies and pension funds do not count unrealized capital gains
or losses on long—berm bonds as part of their annual rate of return. But even
disregarding them, any instrument which commits the investor to a fixed nominal
flow of coupon income and a money—fixed principal mmount at maturity is in fact
extremely risky even for an investor with a long-run horizon, in fact, espe—
cially for such an investor.
Many institutional investors have already come to the conclusion that long—
term fixed—interest securities are too risky relative to their expected return
and have simply stopped investing in them. If that trend continues we can
expect to see the disappearance of these financial instruments frOm the U.S.
capital market. In Great Britain the market for long—term fixed—interest cor-
porate debt disappeared rather quickly in l97 and has not reappeared since.11b
theextent that this market is to maintain its viabiity in the U.S., the mean
realrateof return will have to be higher than in the past.
Finally, what are the implications of our findings for investments in com-
modity futures contracts or other inflation—hedging assets? Our results mdi——28—
cate that as long as stocks are negatively correlated with inflation, there is
going to be a need for some kind of asset that haS the property that its rate of
return is positively correlated with inflation. Commodity futures contracts
have the considerable advantage of already being in existence and therefore can
be used right away.
There are some new types of financial instruments that have started to
appear and may play an increasingly significant role in this regard in the
future. I am referring specifically to commodity—linked bonds, that is to say,
bonds whose principal and/or interest is linked to the price of some commodity.
The silver—linked bonds issued by the Sunshine Mining Corporation are an
example. Bonds linked to the price of petroleum and other natural resources
owned bytheissuing corporation are being actively discussed bytheinstitu-
tionalinvestment community. These securities would share with commodity
futures contracts the property that their rate of return wnuld be positively
correlated with the rate of inflation. If significant inflation persists in the
future, these kinds of securities willprobablycome to play an important role
ininvestment portfolios.—29—
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Assuminga 15%peryear nominal interest rate on corporate debt, a 50% tax
rate, and a 12% per year expected rate of inflation, we get a real after—tax
interest rate on the debt of _1.5%peryear. Substituting this value into
the formula for I, 6.5%peryear for ROC and 1/3 for the debt/equity ratio we
find that ROE10% per year.
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whereSDbandSDrepresentthe standard deviations on billsandstocks,
respectively, and R the correlation coefficient between them. X is the pro-
portion of the portfolio invested in stocks, and therefore 1—X is the propor-
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Note that when we combine bills with stocks, this formula yields a negative
number for the proportion of stocks, which means we would actually have to sell
some stock short In order to minimize risk. This explains why curve 1 in Figure
1 does not have the same shape as curve 2 at its lower end.
11 The optimization procedure is described in Markowitz, op. cit.